A classified operation by Canada’s spy agency was abruptly terminated after senior leadership discovered it placed CSIS officers in “unnecessary danger,” according to a newly released watchdog report that raises alarming questions about risk management within our national intelligence apparatus.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) revealed that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service operation was shut down in 2021 when executives learned field officers were operating under conditions that potentially compromised their safety. The investigation found that operational risks had been “improperly characterized” in briefing materials presented to CSIS leadership.
“When we see intelligence operations terminated over safety concerns, it signals a potential breakdown in the risk assessment chain,” said Leah West, a national security law expert at Carleton University. “The question becomes whether this is an isolated incident or indicative of broader systemic issues within CSIS.”
The watchdog investigation determined that CSIS executives had not been fully informed about the operational risks before approving the mission. This revelation comes at a particularly sensitive time for Canada’s intelligence community, which faces mounting pressure to counter foreign interference while maintaining strict operational protocols.
NSIRA’s report, while heavily redacted to protect classified information, highlights a troubling gap between field operations and headquarters oversight. The review found that “inadequate supervision” and “inconsistent application of risk assessment frameworks” contributed to the dangerous situation.
“Internal communications appeared to minimize certain operational risks,” the report stated, “resulting in approval of activities that may not have met the agency’s own safety standards.”
CSIS Director David Vigneault acknowledged the findings in a written response, stating the agency has implemented “enhanced risk assessment protocols” and “additional supervisory checkpoints” to prevent similar situations. However, security experts question whether these measures go far enough.
The incident occurs against a backdrop of expanded CSIS operations targeting foreign interference, espionage, and extremism, requiring intelligence officers to operate in increasingly complex environments. Former CSIS officer Jessica Davis told CO24 that “balancing operational effectiveness with officer safety has always been challenging, but becomes even more critical as threats evolve.”
Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc’s office declined to comment on specific operational details but emphasized that “the safety of those who protect Canada’s national security is paramount.”
This isn’t the first time CSIS has faced scrutiny over operational practices. In 2020, Federal Court Justice Patrick Gleeson criticized the agency for a “troubling pattern” of providing insufficient information to the courts when seeking warrants.
The watchdog has recommended comprehensive changes to CSIS’s risk assessment frameworks, including clearer definitions of acceptable risk thresholds and improved communication channels between field operations and headquarters. NSIRA also called for enhanced training for operational managers and greater accountability measures for senior leadership.
The revelations raise important questions for Canadian security policy: How can we ensure our intelligence agencies maintain the necessary operational flexibility while implementing robust risk management protocols? And perhaps more critically, who is ultimately responsible when intelligence operations place Canadian officers in harm’s way?
